Will Russia Concede Syria?

• 05.29.2015, 10:30
•  Near East

By chance or by coincidence on the same day, May 28, we have witnessed similar signals both from the US and Russia high level officials according to which their stances on Syria "come closer". On the occasion foreign minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov declared:

"Our and the United States’ positions, I think, are really getting closer, especially when it comes to statements that there are no alternatives to political settlement in Syria on the basis of the Geneva Communique of 2012."  

In his turn the US vice president Joe Biden in his speech at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, defended the Obama administration's decision to cooperate with Russia on areas of "clear mutual interest," particularly noting: "It makes sense to cooperate where there's a clear mutual interest as long as you're not being asked to back off."

What does this mean for Syria and particularly for Assad regime?

"Political settlement in Syria on the basis of the Geneva Communique of 2012," Lavrov referred to in his speech, assumes the need for forming  "transitional government body with full executive powers," which could include members of the present Syrian government and of the opposition.  This is "a sticking point" for Russia and the US on Syria. However, as it is known, Russia and the US differ in their positions on Assad: while Obama administration wants Assad to resign at the beginning of the process of political settlement in Syria, Russia aims to leave the question of Assad, to resign or to stay on power, to be decided at the end of the reconciliation process.  Then which of the sides is going to concede?

To answer the question and to get complete picture it is necessary to draw parallels among other issues the sides try to agree on such as Ukrainian Crisis. It is reasonable for the sides to try to compensate their possible concessions on one issue with extra gains on another. Thus, if Russia agrees to make concessions on the question of Assad in Syria, then it should strive for gains on Ukraine; the same logic is to apply for the US. However if we try to weight the strategic importance of Syria and Ukraine for Russia, it would become clear that in case of Ukraine Russia is to be less unwilling to go to concession than in case of Syria.  In this sense it is not a secret either that Ukraine has less strategic importance for the US than for its close neighbor Russia, the proof of which is the fact that Ukraine still is not a NATO member.  Thus coming from this logic one is to assume that the higher the Russia’s gains on Ukraine, the higher the possibility is for Russia to concede on Syria.