As a Result of Not Carrying Out the Demands of the UN SC Resolutions By Azerbaijan Ceasefire Agreement Was Suggested

• 05.13.2017, 21:55
• Greta Avetisyan
•  "Insight" Analytical Center ,  NKR,  Analytics

On May 12, 1994 Armenia, Artsakh and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefire agreement to end the active military actions and resolve Karabakh conflict through peaceful negotiations. 23 years have passed since the trilateral agreement and 22 years since the agreement on strengthening the ceasefire regime, while Azerbaijan does not stop intensifing the situation on the border. Especially during the recent years shootings and sabotages by the Azerbaijani side have become even more and in the result victims are being recorded on both sides.

Moreover, on April 2016 Azerbaijan initiated large-scale military actions against Artsakh Republic using aircraft, different types of rocket and artillery systems, armored vehicles.

It is noteworthy that in the presence of 1994-95 ceasefire agreements Azerbaijani side does not fulfill its commitments, moreover, as if forgetting about their existence it continues referring to the 4 resolutions of the UN Security Council, putting the emphasis only on one point – withdrawal of Armenian forces. In this context it is important to pay attention to several factors.

First, besides the point in the UN SC resolutions voiced by Azerbaijan, primary demand of these resolutions was immediate secession of firing, all types of military actions and enmity. It was because of not implementing this demand and the continuation of the military actions by Azerbaijan that it was impossible to rely on these resolutions. Thus a ceasefire agreement was suggested taking into consideration the new reality. Despite signing this agreement until now Azerbaijan continues violating the ceasefire regime.

Second, doesn't Azerbaijan in fact refuse the 1994-95 ceasefire agreements by constantly referring to the UN SC resolutions and creating tension on the borders? Maybe the logical step coming for the Azerbaijani policy should be officially refusing these agreements, if there were not certain factors contradicting its own interests. It is obvious for the Azerbaijani authorities that such a step would be perceived as a destructive step both by its own society and the international community. At the same time it would increase the possibility of the resumption of war, which can be a serious threat for the Aliyev clan to lose its power.

It is noteworthy that after the April war Azerbaijan was trying to refer only to the oral agreement on ceasing the firing reached on April 5, trying to show as if it is replacing the 1994-95 agreements. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the above mentioned risks, the authorities of the country avoided to directly talk about this, while the indirect attempts failed.

It is obvious that the policy carried out by the Azerbaijani authorities and the existing situation in the context of Karabakh conflict do not correspond to the commitments of Azerbaijan fixed in the 1994-95 agreements. It is conditioned by this fact that the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, despite the absence of addressed calls, periodically call on to observe the ceasefire regime. It is also obvious that at least the mediators of these agreements cannot be indifferent towards the violations of the ceasefire regime and should adopt tougher stance towards Baku.

This refers also to the agreements reached during the Vienna and St. Petersburg summits, the aim of which were to carry out “from confidence building to conflict resolution” approach. An approach, which includes certain issues, among them keeping the ceasefire regime, excluding the aggressive rhetoric and several means for building confidence. Azerbaijan, however, for another time refuses to carry out the reached agreements (installing investigative mechanisms on the borders, expanding the mission of Kasperchik’s office), which are aimed at reducing the number of the incidents and sabotage attempts on the borders, as well as to clearly indicate the side violating the ceasefire.

In the created situation, maybe, besides carrying out the above mentioned agreements reached, it would be logical to sign an agreement among Armenia, NKR and Azerbaijan on non-use of force and threat of force with clear guarantees. This will be an important step towards formation of an atmosphere of trust contributing to the settlement of the conflict through effective negotiations.